Guest Editors: Visa A. J. Kurki, Diana Mocanu, and Daniel Dodds, University of Helsinki.
The Western legal tradition is built upon the distinction between persons and things. Traditionally, persons have been considered the only entities capable of holding legal rights and/or duties, and legal personhood has been almost exclusively attributed to human beings and juristic persons (states, companies and so on). On the other hand, legal agency – the capacity to be held responsible and to perform legally valid acts – has been reserved for adult human beings deemed to be of sound mind.
In recent years, these traditional legal categories have been under increasing challenges. On one hand, there have been calls to extend legal personhood to natural entities, nonhuman animals and even AI systems. Legislators have responded in various ways. Some jurisdictions have extended legal personhood to rivers, lagoons and other natural entities, and the EU Parliament has suggested the introduction of a new category of persons for sufficiently complex AI systems, the “electronic person”. On the other hand, some US states have introduced blanket bans, prohibiting the extension of legal personhood beyond the traditional categories of natural and juristic persons.
Old standards for attributing legal agency are undergoing a transformation as well. For example, many people with disabilities have traditionally been denied the capacity to make legal decisions about their own lives, either partially or totally. However, the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities is based on the idea of universal legal capacity, whereby the denial of legal agency merely based on disability is prohibited. Legislators have then been presented with the challenge of how to incorporate this idea of universal legal capacity into national legislation.
This special issue invites scholars to explore and critically discuss the relationship between personhood, agency, and legislation. What role has legislation played and will continue to play in determining the meaning and scope of legal personhood and agency? We welcome contributions employing various approaches, including theoretical analyses, case studies, and methodological innovations. The proposals may consider, but are not limited to, the following topics:
- The relationship between legislation and legal personhood
- Legislative challenges in tackling new categories of legal personhood
- Criteria used in legislation to recognize personhood
- Legislative and parliamentary procedures for incorporating non-human needs in lawmaking
- The role of legislation in enabling legal agency
- Cases where legislation has been instrumental in transforming and extending the scope of personhood, or in blocking such changes
- The implementation of new international norms regarding personhood/agency in national law
- Legislative trends and historical examples in the legal capacity of members of different social groups
Please send your abstracts and papers directly to the corresponding email address: specialissue.tpleg@gmail.com
Deadline for submission of abstracts: January 31th, 2025.
Abstracts should include the provisional title and an outline of the proposed content. A typical abstract is 500-800 words, though there is no strict word limit. Editors will conduct a preliminary review of the abstracts and invite selected authors to submit full papers.
The authors are expected to submit full paper drafts by May 31th, 2025. There may be an option for a work-in-progress workshop to discuss the papers, which would take place in June.
Deadline for submission of full papers: September 15th, 2025.
The final papers will undergo a regular, rigorous peer review process. Hence, the publication of the invited papers cannot be guaranteed.
Papers typically range from 6,000 to 8,000 words. However, shorter submissions of at least 4,000 words may be exceptionally accepted under certain circumstances.
Papers should adhere to the OSCOLA (4th edition) Style Guide.
Please read detailed instructions for authors here.
